' "
3 Eunomus, 157 8.
If it still be said that juries would disagree, as to what was
natural justice, and that one jury would decide one way, and
another jury another; the answer is, that such a thing is hardly
credible, as that twelve men, taken at random from the people at
large, should unanimously decide a question of natural justice one
way, and that twelve other men, selected in the same manner,
should unanimously decide the same question the other way,
unless they were misled by the justices. If, however, such things
should sometimes happen, from any cause whatever, the remedy
is by appeal, and new trial.
[1] Judges do not even live up to that part of their own maxim,
which requires jurors to try the matter of fact. By dictating to
them the laws of evidence, that is, by dictating what evidence
they may hear, and what they may not hear, and also by dictating
to them rules for weighing such evidence as they permit them to
hear, they of necessity dictate the conclusion to which they
shall arrive.
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