But each written law, in order to be a law, must be taken only in
some one definite and distinct sense; and that definite and
distinct sense must be selected from the almost infinite variety
of senses which its words are capable of. How is this selection to
be made? It can be only by the aid of that perception of natural
law, or natural justice, which men naturally possess.
Such, then, is the comparative certainty of the natural and the
written law. Nearly all the certainty there is in the latter, so
far as it relates to principles, is based upon, and derived from,
the still greater certainty of the former. In fact, nearly all the
uncertainty of the laws under which we live, which are a mixture
of natural and written laws, arises from the difficulty of
construing, or, rather, from the facility of misconstruing, the
written law; while natural law has nearly or quite the same
certainty as mathematics. On this point, Sir William Jones, one of
the most learned judges that have ever lived, learned in Asiatic
as well as European law, says, and the fact should be kept
forever in mind, as one of the most important of all truths: "It
is pleasing to remark, the similarity, or, rather, the identity of
those conclusions which pure, unbiased reason, in all ages; and
nations, seldom fails to draw, in such juridical inquiries as are
not fettered and manacled by positive institutions.
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