But it may be said that, unless jurors submit to the control of
the court, in matters of law, they may disagree amongthemselves,
and never come to any judgment; and thus justice fail to be done.
Such a case is perhaps possible; but, if possible, it can occur
but rarely; because, although one jury may disagree, a succession
of juries are not likely to disagree that is, on matters of
natural law, or abstract justice. [2] If such a thing should
occur, it would almost certainly be owing to the attempt of the
court to mislead them. It is hardly possible that any other cause
should be adequate to produce such an effect; because justice
comes very near to being a self-evident principle. The mind
perceives it almost intuitively. If, in addition to this, the
court be uniformly on the side of justice, it is not a reasonable
supposition that a succession of juries should disagree about it.
If, therefore, a succession of juries do disagree on the law of
any case, the presumption is, not that justice fails of being
done, but that injustice is prevented that injustice, which
would be done, if the opinion of the court were suffered to
control the jury.
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