Until a better line could be
opened, Burnside was allowed to concentrate most of his forces in
the vicinity of Loudon, where he guarded the whole valley. His
cavalry connected with Rosecrans on the north side of the Tennessee,
and also held the line of the Hiwassee on the left.
On the last day of September Burnside reported the concentration of
his forces and submitted three alternate plans of assisting
Rosecrans: [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 954.]
First, to abandon East Tennessee and move all his forces by the
north bank of the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. This was what
Halleck had seemed to propose. Second, to cross the Holston and
march directly against Bragg's right flank whilst Rosecrans should
attack in front. This was essentially what Grant afterward did,
putting Sherman in a position similar to that which Burnside would
have taken. Third, to march with 7000 infantry and 5000 cavalry
entirely around Bragg by the east, and strike his line of
communications at Dalton or thereabouts. This had a strong
resemblance to the strategy of Sherman next spring, when he forced
Johnston out of Dalton by sending McPherson to his rear at Resaca.
Pages:
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858