It was
delay in advancing, both in Tennessee and in Virginia, that thus
directly led to disaster. If a brilliant victory at Chickamauga had
been coincident with the fall of Vicksburg and Lee's defeat at
Gettysburg, it does not seem rash to believe that the collapse of
the Confederacy would have been hastened by a year.
Two of the generals who answered these questions attained afterward
to such distinction that their replies are an interesting means of
learning their mental character and gauging their development.
Sheridan answered briefly that he believed Bragg had no more than
25,000 or 30,000 infantry and artillery, with a "large" cavalry
force. In this he was very close to the mark. Bragg's report for the
latter part of May, before sending reinforcements to Johnston,
showed his forces present for duty to be 37,000 infantry, a little
less than 3000 artillery, and 15,000 cavalry, in round numbers.
Deduct 10,000 from these, and Sheridan is found to be sufficiently
accurate. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 846.
The reference to Bragg's returns of strength to the
Adjutant-General's office makes this an appropriate place to note
the method of making these returns and its bearing on the much
debated question of the "Effective Total" commonly given by
Confederate writers as the force of their armies compared with ours.
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