[Footnote: _Id_., pp.
383, 384.] The only move that Rosecrans made was to send on the 8th
to his general officers commanding corps and divisions, a
confidential circular asking their opinion in writing in answer to
the following questions, in substance,--
1. Has the enemy been so materially weakened that this army could
advance on him at this time with strong reasonable chances of
fighting a great and successful battle?
2. Is an advance of our army likely to prevent additional
reinforcements being sent against General Grant by Bragg?
3. Is an immediate or early advance of our army advisable?
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 395.]
With substantial unanimity they answered that it was not advisable
to move, though they seem generally to have been aware that
Breckinridge with about 10,000 men of all arms had gone from Bragg
to Johnston. When Rosecrans reported the result of this council to
Halleck, the latter reminded him of the maxim that "councils of war
never fight," and that the responsibility for his campaign rests
upon a commanding general and cannot be shared by a council of war.
The careful study of the correspondence elicited by Rosecrans's
circular would make a most valuable commentary upon the theme,
"_Why_ Councils of War never fight.
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