[Footnote: _Id_., p. 163.] He pointed out the necessity of reducing
the number and size of garrisons in the rear, and making everything
bend to the great object of organizing the army for active
initiative against the enemy. He recommended building block-houses
to protect the principal bridges on the railroads, where very small
garrisons could give comparative security to our lines of
communication. This plan was ultimately carried out on a large
scale, and was the necessary condition of Sherman's Atlanta campaign
of 1864. Taken as a whole, Halleck's instructions to Burnside
presented no definite objective, and were a perfunctory sort of
introduction to his new command, which raises a doubt whether the
organization of a little army in the Department of the Ohio met his
approval.
The fact was that Burnside was acting on an understanding with
President Lincoln himself, whose ardent wish to send a column for
the relief of the loyal people of East Tennessee never slumbered,
and who was already beginning to despair of its accomplishment by
Rosecrans's army. The uneasiness at Washington over Rosecrans's
inaction was becoming acute, and Mr. Lincoln was evidently turning
to Burnside's department in hope of an energetic movement there.
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