I certainly so understood it at
the time, as my report witnesses, and McClellan's original report
sustains this view. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i.
pp. 31, 426.] If he had been impatient to have our attack delivered
earlier, he had reason for double impatience that Franklin's fresh
troops should assail Lee's left simultaneously with our assault of
his other wing, unless he regarded action there as hopeless, and
looked upon our movement as a sort of forlorn hope to keep Lee from
following up his advantages.
But even these are not all the troublesome questions requiring an
answer. It will be remembered that Franklin's corps, after forcing
Crampton's Gap, had remained in Pleasant Valley between Rohrersville
and Boonsboro until Tuesday night (16th September). McClellan then
ordered Couch's division to be sent to occupy Maryland Heights and
observe the enemy in Harper's Ferry, whilst Franklin with Smith's
and Slocum's divisions should march to the battle-field at daybreak
of Wednesday. Why could not Couch be called up and come on our left
as well as A. P. Hill's division, which was the last of the
Confederate troops to leave the ferry, there being nothing to
observe after it was gone? Couch's division, coming with equal pace
with Hill's on the other side of the river would have answered our
needs as well as one from Porter's corps.
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