It is also noticeable that the plan as
given in the final report leaves no "centre" with which to "advance"
when either of the flank movements should be successful, Porter's
corps in reserve being the only one not included in the movement as
described.
Further evidence that the plan did not originally include the wide
separation of two corps to the right to make the extended turning
movement is found in Hooker's incomplete report, and in the wide
interval in time between the marching of his corps and that of
Mansfield. Hooker was ordered to cross the Antietam at about two
o'clock in the afternoon of the 16th by the bridge in front of
Keedysville and the ford below it. He says that after his troops
were over and in march, he rode back to McClellan, who told him that
he might call for reinforcements, and that when they came they
should be under his command. Somewhat later McClellan rode forward
with his staff to observe the progress making, and Hooker again
urged the necessity of reinforcements. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xix. pt. i. p. 217.] Yet Sumner did not receive orders to send
Mansfield's corps to his support till evening, and it marched only
half an hour before midnight, [Footnote: _Id_.
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