, if he would withdraw from the understanding with
England as to Mediterranean questions. The entry into the plans of
England for the Armenian question, which were diametrically opposed to
those of Russia, provoked the active enmity of that power, with which
Italy had until then been on friendly terms. Thenceforward Russia
united her influence with that of France in creating difficulties for
Italy in Abyssinia as the punishment of Crispi, and at the same time
the means of paralyzing one of the members of the Triple Alliance.
Lord Salisbury, vacillating, as is his way, and under persuasion of
the powers opposed to his action, consented to delay and negotiate,
thus giving the Sultan time to prepare the defenses of the
Dardanelles, making the _coup de main_, possible at first, then
impossible, and necessitating serious naval operations, which
were likely to involve considerable losses if the pressure at
Constantinople were to be successful.
The abandonment of the inconsiderate scheme, initiated in obedience
to a religious agitation and far too daring for a statesman of Lord
Salisbury's nervelessness, having drawn Italy into such difficulties
as the result of her obedience to his call, the least that Crispi
could expect was that he would be supported by all the moral if not by
the military power of England, whose influence in Abyssinia was very
great. During the government of Lord Rosebery that influence had been
distinctly exercised in favor of Italy, in opposition to that of
France, and, when Crispi asked for the privilege of landing troops at
Zeila, the English port for Abyssinia, in case of war, it had been
accorded, giving Italy the advantage of a menace on the rear of all
the positions of Menelek, which had in the early stages of the trouble
been efficient.
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