And so the day closed down with no success on either
side, but with a decisive demonstration to the Moslems that, if they
desired victory, to their admiral had better be left the organisation by
which it was to be obtained.
Whether Doria really desired a pitched battle can never be known; that
which is certain is that, during the whole time the fleets were in touch,
all his dispositions make it appear there was nothing of which he was so
much afraid. And yet it was the opportunity of his life; he had superiority
in numbers, he had valiant and experienced leaders, and sixty thousand men
thirsting for battle, under his command. Also he had his opportunity,
which, had he seized upon, must have ended in victory, did those who were
under his orders only fight as he had every reason to believe that they
would. As it was, he threw away the gift of fortune, and left to the
Osmanli the practical dominance of the Mediterranean Sea until that great
day in 1571 when Don John of Austria, the natural son of Charles V., proved
to the world at Lepanto that the Turk was not invincible upon the waters.
It is true that Doria was awkwardly situated; Kheyr-ed-Din held the
interior position, and that leader was a great believer in the adage that
"if Brag is a good dog, Holdfast is a better." He was well aware of his
numerical inferiority, and in consequence refused to listen to the frenzied
appeals of the excited Moslems to be led against the Christian dogs.
Pages:
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216