His argument, embodied in a long and technical
harangue, may be reduced to the following:
If we cannot go straight at the enemy and force our way through the
entrance under his cannon why should we not reduce the fortress of
Prevesa by a siege? Once masters of this height, we could close the
strait by sinking in it vessels laden with stones, and we then have the
Ottoman fleet at our mercy.
But Doria the sailor was not to be led by Gonzaga the soldier. He said:
The advice seems sound, but in reality it would prove most dangerous if
followed. Barbarossa must have landed some of his men, the cavalry which
defeated Grimani's raid will no doubt come again from the interior, if
necessary. If we deprive our ships of their soldiers we expose ourselves
to a sea-fight under most disadvantageous conditions. But most,
important of all is the fact that time presses; the season is far
advanced; at any time the fleet may be driven off these shores by a
storm, in which case what would become of the troops left on shore?
Again, if it comes on to blow a tempest from the westward we may lose
not only our troops, but our ships, in fact the whole expedition.
At the battle of Actium, Octavius occupied the shore upon which Hernando
Gonzaga wished to land and assault; but notwithstanding this fact Octavius
did not attempt the passage of the gulf but waited for his enemy outside.
Doria was therefore all the more justified in not sacrificing ships and men
in attempting to force an entrance now that this same shore was in the
hands of the enemy.
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