But as the imprudence or prodigality of a dying man
might exhaust the inheritance and leave only risk and labor to his
successor, he was empowered to retain the Falcidian portion; to deduct,
before the payment of the legacies, a clear fourth for his own
emolument. A reasonable time was allowed to examine the proportion
between the debts and the estate, to decide whether he should accept or
refuse the testament; and if he used the benefit of an inventory, the
demands of the creditors could not exceed the valuation of the effects.
The last will of a citizen might be altered during his life or rescinded
after his death; the persons whom he named might die before him, or
reject the inheritance, or be exposed to some legal disqualification. In
the contemplation of these events he was permitted to substitute second
and third heirs, to replace each other according to the order of the
testament; and the incapacity of a madman or an infant to bequeath his
property might be supplied by a similar substitution. But the power of
the testator expired with the acceptance of the testament; each Roman of
mature age and discretion acquired the absolute dominion of his
inheritance, and the simplicity of the civil law was never clouded by
the long and intricate entails which confine the happiness and freedom
of unborn generations.
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